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With news of legal action against the Oklahoma University's Health
Science Center, and the inevitable consequences of this suit on behalf of
the 24 infants with spina bifida who were not recommended for active
treatment, but allowed to die without benefit of surgery, antibiotics or
sedation, the time seems opportune , before the nation's media heighten
community emotions, to examine the crucial clinical and ethical basis of
the OUHSC team' s program as published (Pediatrics I ~ 83: 72: pp. 450458), and evaluate calmly, according to criteria which pass the tests of the
whole community, their worth and soundness. This legal battle will excite
passions and divide this nation. It has the ingredients of a Monday night
movie. Its impact on law and medicine in America will be felt for years. For
all of these reasons, prior to popular, partisan commentary, I hope this
contribution will further the reflection among the health care communities
closest, most involved - and with the most to lose and gain.
The Selection Issue
Spina bifida has existed throughout human history. Hippocrates was
aware of the condition, and the teacher in Rembrandt's "The Anatomy
Lesson" illustrated spina bifida in 1652 and gave it the name we use. In the
treatment history of the condition as outlined by John Lorber,1 from the
beginnings of the human race until the late 19th century, spina bifida was
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not treated, as no procedure was seen as beneficial. The great majority of
sufferers died in their infancy, as they did from the other scourges of
newborns .
Apart from some isolated efforts to treat the condition, it was not until
the 1950s that advances in medical science, developments in antibiotics
and neurosurgery, the introduction of the new shunt system by Holter,
made active treatment productive. However, during that decade, since
many infants still died of meningitis or other complications, a percentage
only of the babies born each year with myelomeningocele received
vigorous treatment. "Even in the most advanced neurosurgical centre in
Boston," Lorber writes , "Ingraham and his colleagues (1944) operated on
infants only if they had no serious neurological lesions and had survived
for at least a year or 18 months from birth , and if their general condition
was good" (p. 5).
While in Sheffield (Children's Hospital) , the policy was introduced to
treat more and more infants , and the results of this aggressive approach
were felt around the world during the 50s-60s, selective treatment
remained the general rule in some pediatric centers, as the reports of Hide
(Oxford) ,2 Stark and Drummond (Edinburgh) ,3 Smith and Smith
(Melbourne),4Shurtleff et al. (Seattle) ,5 Woolraich,6 Feetham,7 Robertson,8
all show. The natural history (the shunt-therapy, paralysis, mental
retardation, bowel and bladder problems, the social, educational, marital
implications), as described in Laurence's classic analysis , for instance,
continued to deter the universal acceptance of a policy of automatically
initiating aggressive care plans for all infants , pediatric advances
notwithstanding.9
It is against this background that we should assess the selection and
treatment policy at Oklahoma's Health Sciences Center. Before looking at
the OUHSC team's criteria for vigorous and supportive care, honesty
demands we acknowledge that the Center's policy lies within a stream of
philosophy and practice that has both long history and respectable allies .
Further, fairness also demands we admit that even R. B. Zachary, one of
the pioneers of aggressive treatment , and the consistent critic of Lorber's
approach, does not advocate that surgery be performed on every child with
spina bifida. "It may be asked whether I would advocate operation on
every baby with spina bifid a," Zachary writes (British Medical Journal
1977:2: 1460-1462). "Of course not. As with every aspect of surgery, there
are criteria for selection, which should be based on sound medical and
surgical principles and a knowledge of the prospects with and without
surgery." Babies, in Zachary's charge, with severe intracranial hemorrhage
or another major life-threatening anomaly, for instance, would not receive
surgery because it would have no bearing at all upon whether these infants
lived or died. The traditional rule about futile treatment wisely applies.
The Criteria Issue

One distressing fact about the OUHSC published report is the repeated
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admission that the myelomeningocele team reached its consensus
decisions without precise clinical criteria for vigorous or simply supportive
care. "Whereas there are no specific criteria for treatment, factors
considered significant by Shurtleff et al (and to a lesser extent, those
considered significant by Lorber) are reviewed. Usually a consensus is
achieved , but sometimes the team is ambivalent. In this instance, a
recommendation for treatment is made ," runs the relevant section.
Whether all the selection criteria proposed by Shurtleff in 1974 are
considered decisive remains unclear, as does also why the specific factors
Lorber presented are significant only "to a lesser extent." While the three
case reports included in the study refer to "severe congenital
hydrocephalus and an L-llevel of paralysis at birth," (the other two cases
mention "congenital hydrocephalus and a large thoracolumbar sac" and a
male infant with "a T -10 level of paralysis and congenital hydrocephalus at
birth"), detailed reasons , charts and graphs are disappointingly missing.
Exactly why supportive care was recommended for 33 babies (the major
adverse clinical criteria) remains unclear.
Serious questions abound. "Why did they recommend only supportive
care for these children (five children with L-5 sacral lesions)?" specialist
John Freeman, Birth Defects Center, Johns Hopkins Hospital, asks. 10
This lack of scientific rigor, the incomplete presentation of the degree of
severity and incidence of complication that we find in Laurence, Lorber,
Shurtleff, the reports of Smith and Smith, Hunt et aI., II and Sherman
Stein, Schut and Ames, 12 as well as the failure to present all their working
criteria, are hard to understand , and one well appreciates Freeman's
strong comments, and the words of Nat Hentoff about "a death row for
infants in Oklahoma." 13 One hopes that the myelomeningocele team will
publish its criteria for selection in full , together with its rationale for
prioritizing, excluding and including clinical factors in its evaluations.
The Decision Making Issue

,

The OUHSC report does give information about key aspects of the
team's approach : its method of making treatment decisions; the actual
membership and structure of the team both in theory and practice. We are
told something about the difficulties the team faced in combat. First, the
tea m is made up of a physician's assistant , acting as full-time program
coordinator, a pediatrician, an orthopedist, a neurosurgeon, a urologist , a
nurse clinician, a social worker, physical and occupational therapists, and
a psychologist. One of the physicians is chief of the program. Certainly,
such a group possesses the range of medical knowledge and expertise not
only to provide data for highly reliable recommendations, but also for
efficient ones. Decisions, the report mentions, are made by consensus, and
communicated to fa mily by several members of the team as a group: "One
physician accompanied by the coordinator, social worker, and / or nurse."
Furthermore, regular contact with the family aftet it has elected to defer
surgery, is maintained by the clinic coordinator and social worker.
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In day-to-day life, however, this approach, structure and decision
making method had real problems. "Usually a consensus is achieved , but
sometimes the team is ambivalent ," the report states. Also, we are told ,
"occasionally, a decision was made in what could be considered, in
retrospect, an inadequate assessment." In the second case report, we are
informed , "a rapid evaluation was made. Only two of the team members
(which two?) saw the baby, and no input from Social Services was
obtained." Most disconcerting, moreover, is the following: "with the
number of diverse personnel involved , differences do occur in decision
making and the approach is not uniform from one case to the next.
However, the alternatives of a dogmatic protocol or an incomplete
evaluation by less than all services involved appeared to us to be
unsatisfactory choices" (p. 455).
John Freeman has severely criticized these admissions , the claims that
the approach is "workable" and results in assessments that are "reasonably
accurate." The admitted lack of uniformity is a maj or cause of concern, I
concur. Although treatment decisions are often a mix of imperfect science
and human art, any approach to them should embody maximum
consistency, as little arbitrariness as professional responsibilities demand .
A uniform approach to the treatment of spina bifida, AIDS or cancer need
not imply either of the alternatives the report mentions. Moreover, in the
actual contents of the negative recommendations, the report contains
difficulties not mentioned by Freeman, which provide further cause for
comment.
"If the team's assessment is pessimistic," the report states, "the family is
informed that we do not consider them obligated to have the baby treated .
They are given time to assess the inform'a tion before they reach a decision"
(p. 452). Surely, there is something wrong with this statement, especially
the phrase, " . .. we do not consider them obligated to have the baby
treated." Has a medical team the right to make such a recommendation? Is
this a communication of a clinical evaluation and an agreed medical
judgment or something different? Personally, I consider s ch a statement
not only a serious usurpation of parental authority, but a classic example
of medical paternalism at its worst. Parents should be assisted with their
feelings of guilt , as Cohen advises. 14 However, such support should not, I
believe, distort the physician-patient roles .
The thrust , the implied control, furthermore , clearly undermines the
team's stated belief that parents rather than the team's experts in the field
of myelomeningoceles are the real decision-makers. The team acts , so the
report states, upon the parents' decision . Aggressive treatment will be
given should parents request or insist , in spite of a pessimistic assessment
by the team, and presumably, supportive treatment will be given to a child
when parents ask, in spite of an optimistic recommendation. 15 Is this,
whatever the nation's feeling about parent rights, a sound decision-making
policy? John Lorber has written, "Who should make the decision totreat or
not to treat? Most consider that it is the doctor's duty. The doctor should
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be a consultant and an expert in this field of medicine (Ellis, 1974).
Without such a proviso , disastrous mistakes may be committed . One
cannot leave the decision to junior staff. One cannot leave it to the parents
because they are hardly ever sufficiently informed and because they a re
under severe emotional strain at the time . .. Of course, the parents'
wishes must be taken into account , though usually they will ask the
doctor's advice, even if the doctor appears to leave the decision to them ."1 6
As all who have viewed the educational video , "Born Dying" or assisted
parents of spina bifida infants, should agree, there is wisdom in these
words, even if they run counter to the stream of legal and medical
inclinations in the US and Britain today.1 7
The Philosophical and Ethical Issues

The OUHSC report does not deal with basic philosophical issues , but
rather with such matters as whether the team's program is workable,
whether it addresses , in a reasonable fashion the current ethical dilemma
concerning the treatment of spina bifida infants. However, often it
implicitly deals with such issues as the purpose of medicine and the social
responsibilities of health care professionals. Decisions not to treat
aggressively reflect attitudes about life and death , the meaning and
purpose of health and illness. Indirectly, at least to some degree, those who
make such judgments are expressing convictions about society, authority,
science and civilization. In making a decision about treatment, expressly
not to treat a baby with an L-5 sacral lesion whom (it must be presumed)
one knows to have the potential for "normal" if restricted life, given the
advances which have taken place in special education, etc., during the
70S, 18 do we not see definite signs of significant philosophical ideas at
work? Nevertheless, since the team s report does not address such ideas
specifically, all comments are hazardous , and best wait until the court
proceedings or later team-publications. The moral aspects ofthis program
and decision making, however, are expressly addressed .
The report considers the following : i) who should make the decision
about treatment and upon what data base; ii) what is the soundness of
Shaw's formulation of the quality of life, with its emphasis on the societal
factors ; iii) how should babies for whom only supportive care is
recommended be cared for ; iv) the compatibility of the team's approach
with the thought of Jesuit ethicist, Richard A. McCormick. Nowhere and it is rather surprising in the American context - does the report raise
the issue of rights, or the responsibilities of communities toward members.
Nowhere does this final section of the report discuss such matters as
extraordinary or heroic measures in the context of spina bifida, the just
distribution of medical / community resources, or this society'S growing
concern about hard cases in which the benefits are doubtful.
One cannot be involved with cancer, alcoholism or myelomeningocele
without being aware of the financial , emotional, marital stress these
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conditions impose upon spouses and families. To what degree, however,
should the impact of such stress upon next-of-kin influence treatment
decisions? Should our treatment of people with identical symptoms, age,
general circumstances, be quite different depending upon their supportsystems, whether a patient is a widow without children or married , 50, with
strong family ties? For the OUHSC team, the home and society factors are
crucial in any decision about vigorous or supportive care. Patently
influenced by Anthony Shaw's controversial formulation of the quality of
life (QL = NE x (H + S), where NE represents the patient's natural
endowment, H stands for the contribution from home and family, S is the
contribution from society) , in spite of the strong criticisms of Paul
Ramsey, among others, the report states, "The treatment for babies with
identical 'selection criteria' could be quite different, depending on the
contribution from home and society."19 Thus, an infant born to a black
single-parent who is on ADC already, who comes from a country or state
short of welfare funds, will be treated quite differently, one must assume,
from a baby born to white, upper-middle-class parents who have medical
insurance, strong family support, stable marriage and live in a state less
hard hit by Reagan welfare cuts. While it is not hard to understand the
reasoning and conclusion, something seems to be seriously faulty in this
application of situation ethics.
The team's decision to build its moral basis upon the 1974 J AMA study,
"To save or let die," by Richard McCormick, was unfortunate. In 1983,
McCormick published another study in which he changed, clearly
restricted the implications of some of his earlier views. McCormick's new
position expressly sets limits on the use of his ideas as applied and
implemented in centers like OUHSC. 20 In the first study we do find the
principle presented as a primary guideline in decision making, namely,
"the potential of the patient for human relationships." McCormick did
state that if the potential is simply nonexistent "or would be utterly
submerged and underdeveloped in the mere struggle to s rvive," that life
can be considered as having achieved its potential and (one presumes),
allowed to come to its end. Among his caveats, however, McCormick
cautioned against using the principle like a slide rule , applying it from
anencephalic to Down's babies.
In his 1983 study (published while the OUHSC report was awaiting its
appearance in Pediatrics), McCormick visibly restricted the use of his
principle. Life-saving interventions ought not to be omitted for managerial
or institutional reasons , he states, or because of the inability of a particular
family to cope with a badly disabled infant. "N 0 one ought to be allowed to
die," McCormick writes, "simply because these parents are not up to the
task . At this point society has certain responsibilities.
A major limitation cited by McCormick is that life-sustaining
interventions may not be omitted simply because the baby is retarded.
Only where there is excessive hardship on the patient , especially when this
is combined with poor prognosis, or when it becomes clear that expected
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life can be had for a relatively short time and only with the use of continued
artificial feeding , does McCormick see that intervention may be omitted .
Further, throughout this study McCormick insists that the best interests of
the infant are central, and outweigh all other considerations. The proper
welfare of a baby should take precedence over the wishes and decisions of
parents, and should provide society with a legitimate basis for direct
intervention . In view of these firm statements, the OU HSC team's thinking
can be considered as only remotely aligned with McCormick's approach
and categorically contravenes his recent specifications.
Before moving to the legal aspects raised by this report, the fact the
OU HSC myelomeningocele team recommended supportive treatment for
24 infants during the period July I, 1977 - June 30, 1982, the following
question must be asked , "As we look back at the ethical heritage of this
Republic and study the moral philosophies respected in this society, what
sound, intellectually satisfying reasons can be produced for maintaining
that a baby born today with such adverse criteria as L-S sacral lesion ,
hydrocephalus , other tell-tale signs of severe spina bifida - not major
intracranial hemorrhage or obvious symptoms that death is imminent and
impossible to prevent - should be allowed to die? Is it defensible to argue
that it may be permitted to die since its life (spent at the age of 10, should it
live that long, in a wheelchair, aided , perhaps by calipers, with any
hydrocephalus controlled by a valve system etc., as Zachary writes in his
"Life with Spina Bifida," British Medical Journal, 1977:2: 1460-1462), is
not worth living and it is better off in heaven? Is it right to allow it to die
because its parents decide it should? Finally, is it ethically sound to justify
such a death on the grounds that a pediatric specialist / team judges the
parents to lack adequate financial , emotional or community support to
provide properly for the infant, and determine it ought to be allowed to die
from non-treatment?
Such questions will always divide the health care community, especially
when some give ultimate value to the overall good of ~ heir actions , while
others stand with the growing .number who hold rights: the right to live; the
right to health care sufficient to protect that life; the right to access to
health care for all , regardless of ability to pay; as ultimate principles in
treatment decision making. In today's pluralistic society, when
recommendations are made by team consensus as at OUHSC, a consulting
pediatrician, faced with debate over reliable clinical criteria, parents
opposed to aggressive treatment, plus the reality of a report from hospital
social services that a mother lacks emotional maturity to deal well with her
infant, may be justified in thinking he is dealing with a genuine dilemma. In
reality the truly wise and most compassionate path - the moral course
- may be less hard to decide.
In Nebraska, for example, Jack Trembath, spina bifida consultant , St.
Joseph's Hospital, Creighton University and University of Nebraska
Medical Center, Omaha, has little trouble in finding foster parents when
an infant's natural parents are unwilling or unable to provide care. Jim
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Miedaner, director of Physical Therapy, Meyer Children's Rehabilitation
Institute, has strengthened an impressive program that maximizes
mobility, independence, educational achievement.
With the technology now available, the antibiotics, the advances in
physical therapy and special education (I refer especially to the 1985 report
of Sherman et at and their eight-week program for teenagers with spina
bifida which showed better than expected, outcomes in areas such as
consolidating identity, achieving independence, establishing satisfying
interpersonal relationships, finding a vocation), one wonders whether it is
just and beneficent, the "good" thing in terms of the Hippocratic Oath, to
recommend that an infant now born in Omaha with spina bifida (L-5
sacral lesion, etc., as described above) should receive simply passive
treatment.
As the American Academy of Pediatrics Committee on Bioethics stated,
ambiguities and differences of opinion should not preclude consensus on
some ethical principles, in particular, the most basic of all for health care
providers, namely, that one's primary obligation is to the child-patient,
and that withholding or withdrawing life-sustaining treatment is justified
only when such a course serves the interests of that child. We may not be
able to accept that the actual limited potential of the child or the present
lack of community resources are "irrevelant" in making treatment
decisions (as the 1 oint Policy Statement of the Academy maintains), but
we should be agreed that the infant's medical condition should be our
focus throughout.
Hard cases, however, will be debated , forever, and certainly as the
OUHSC case comes to trial. While an ethics report under the auspices of
the Newcastle Regional Hospital Board concluded in 1975 that "the list of
initial adverse criteria set out by Lorber, provides a sufficient basis for ...
selection," (the Lord Bishop of Durham and the president of Ushaw
College were members of the working party) I seriously doubt whether our
gu'a rdians and protectors of the weak, underprivileged, and less fortunate
in this community ought to be moved by arguments, wherper "quality of
life" or "social benefit," which destroy or violate the Constitutional
foundations and customs of this democracy.21 To borrow a line from
Richard McCormick , any general guideline, any set of arguments which
does not embody mercy and compassion for the neighbor in greatest need
is nothing but a racism of the adult, the healthy, the fittest, and eventually a
source of corrosion of the humanity and civilization of those who sit in
courts and congresses.
The Legal Issue

According to Dennis 1. Horan and Burke 1. Balch, the debate over the
respective roles and rights of the state and parents in decision-making
about children has been long settIed. 22 "The state," they write, "in the
exercise of its parens patriae power, has always had the authority to
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intervene on behalf of the best interests of the child" (p . 45). The crux of the
controversy is over the best interests ofa handicapped. a spina bifida child.
for example. In the judgment of Martin Gerry, HEW director of the Office
for Civil Rights, 1975-77, the facts stated in the OUHSC report indicate a
clear violation of state and federal law, of child-abuse statutes and criminal
laws. "I think what you have here," writes Gerry, "is a conspiracy to
commit murder."23 If this legal opinion does have validity, then the court
proceedings will be most significant. The central issues, however, will be
hard fought.
First , there is the issue of whether children born with severe disabilities
are protected under the 14th Amendment of the Constitution, especially if,
as may be argued by the attorneys for OUHSC, they are "dying" or lack
sufficient criteria or potential to be legally called "persons." On the adverse
clinical criteria issue, the well-publicized opinion of Dr. David McLone,
chief of pediatric neurosurgery, Chicago Children's Memorial Hospital ,
that physicians are making decisions not to treat aggressively on the basis
of invalid criteria will have weight, as will comments like Freeman's about
the OUHSC's day-to-day procedures for determining treatment decisions.
On the other side, OUHSC's clinical criteria will be strongly defended, as
will the argument that supportive treatment, when rightly determined, is in
the best interests of the baby, as the editors of the British Medical Journal
have argued more than once. The case will hinge on issues of fact; for
instance, what were the crucial factors in the decisions about the 24 infants
who did not receive vigorous treatment, who made the clinical assessments
in these cases, what specific tests were completed, what do the records
show about the severity of the spina bifida, and of course, the force of
social and family factors in the recommendations against aggressive
treatment. The legal aspects, the specific readings of state and federal
statutes, may be less unclear now that Congress has settled its 1984 Child
Abuse Prevention Act discussions.
Personally, it would appear from the report that the OUHSC team did
fail to meet some standards of competence in making Ja number of their
decisions about treatment. On its own admission, the team was greatly
influenced in its final recommendations by Shaw's suspect quality of life
equation. Whether the team was guilty of culpable negligence or violated
the legal rights of infants in such instances can be decided only after all the
facts and arguments have been presented. Whatever the final judgments,
one hopes that justice not only will be done - to all involved - but will be
seen to be done.24
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